OBJECTIVE Across two experiments, we examined three cognitive biases (order effects, context effects, confirmatory bias) in licensed psychologists' diagnostic reasoning. HYPOTHESES Our main prediction was that psychologist-participants would seek confirming versus disconfirming information after forming an initial diagnostic hypothesis, even given multiple opportunities to seek new information in the same case. We also expected that individual differences would affect diagnostic reasoning, such that psychologists with lower (vs. higher) cognitive reflection tendencies and larger (vs. smaller) bias blind spots would be more likely to demonstrate confirmatory bias. METHOD In Study 1, we recruited 149 licensed psychologists (M = 18 years of experience; 44% women; 71% White) and exposed them to one of four randomly assigned vignettes that varied order effects (one set of symptoms in reversed orders) and context effects (court referral vs. employer referral). They rank ordered a list of four possible initial diagnostic hypotheses and received a piped follow-up choice of which of two pieces of information (confirmatory or disconfirmatory) they wanted to test their initial hypothesis. Study 2 (n = 131; M = 21 years of experience; 53% men; 68% White) replicated and extended Study 1, following the same procedure except offering three sequential choice opportunities. RESULTS Both studies found robust confirmatory information seeking: 92% sought confirmatory information in Study 1, and confirmation persisted across three opportunities in Study 2 (90%, 84%, 77%), although it lowered with each opportunity (generalized logistic mixed regression model), F(2, 378) = 3.85, p = .02, ηp² = .02. CONCLUSION These findings expand a growing body of research on bias in expert judgment. Specifically, psychologists may engage in robust confirmation bias in the process of forming diagnoses. Although further research is needed on bias and its impact on accuracy, psychologists may need to take steps to reduce confirmatory reasoning processes, such as documenting evidence for and against each decision element. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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验证性信息寻求在心理学家的诊断推理中非常有力。


目的 通过两项实验，我们检查了执业心理学家诊断推理中的三种认知偏差（顺序效应、情境效应、验证性偏差）。假设我们的主要预测是，心理学家参与者在形成初步诊断假设后会寻求确认与否定信息，即使在同一案例中有多次机会寻找新信息。我们还预计个体差异会影响诊断推理，因此具有较低（与较高）认知反射倾向和较大（与较小）偏见盲点的心理学家更有可能表现出验证性偏见。方法 在研究 1 中，我们招募了 149 名有执照的心理学家（男 = 18 年经验；44% 女性；71% 白人），让他们接触四个随机分配的小插图之一，这些小插图的顺序效果各不相同（一组相反顺序的症状）和背景影响（法院转介与雇主转介）。他们排列了四种可能的初始诊断假设的列表，并收到了管道式的后续选择，选择了他们想要检验其初始假设的两条信息（确认或否定）中的哪一条。研究 2（n = 131；M = 21 年经验；53% 男性；68% 白人）重复并扩展了研究 1，除了提供三个连续的选择机会外，遵循相同的程序。结果 这两项研究都发现了强有力的确认性信息寻求：在研究 1 中，92% 的人寻求确认性信息，并且在研究 2 中，确认在三个机会中持续存在（90%、84%、77%），尽管每次机会都会降低（广义逻辑混合回归模型） ), F(2, 378) = 3.85, p = .02, ηp² = .02。结论 这些发现扩大了越来越多关于专家判断偏差的研究。 具体来说，心理学家在形成诊断的过程中可能会产生强烈的确认偏差。尽管需要对偏见及其对准确性的影响进行进一步研究，但心理学家可能需要采取措施减少验证性推理过程，例如记录支持和反对每个决策要素的证据。 （PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2024 APA，保留所有权利）。