While scholars of, and participants in, social movements, electoral politics, and organized labor are deeply engaged in contrasting different theories of how political actors should organize, little recent philosophical work has asked what social organizing is. This paper aims to answer this question in a way that can make sense of typical organizing‐related claims and debates. It is intuitive that what social organizing does is bring about some kind of collectivity. However, I argue that the varieties of collectivity most amply theorized by analytic philosophers in recent years, including grouphood and collective intentionality, are not the right kinds to embed in a theory of social organizing. I ultimately argue that the sort of collectivity that organizing characteristically brings about is a special kind of causal complementarity among agents' actions— and that while this can exist alongside grouphood and collective intentionality, it is not the same thing as either. The notion of social organizing that emerges is one that can clarify, without trivializing, a number of pressing contemporary debates about how normal people should conduct themselves as interconnected political actors.

中文翻译：

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什么是社会组织？


尽管社会运动、选举政治和劳工组织的学者和参与者深入研究政治行为者应如何组织的不同理论，但最近很少有哲学著作询问什么是社会组织。本文旨在以一种能够理解典型的组织相关主张和辩论的方式来回答这个问题。直观地说，社会组织的作用是带来某种集体性。然而，我认为，近年来分析哲学家最充分地理论化的各种集体性，包括群体性和集体意向性，并不是嵌入社会组织理论的正确类型。我最终认为，组织所带来的那种集体性是主体行为之间一种特殊的因果互补性——虽然这可以与群体性和集体意向性并存，但它与两者都不是同一回事。出现的社会组织概念可以澄清当代一些紧迫的争论，这些争论涉及普通人作为相互关联的政治行为者应该如何行事。