In this paper, I attempt to articulate a version of qualitative hedonism, grounded in the value theory of the British Moralists. I argue that this view is novel, presents substantial advantages over alternative hedonisms (including rival approaches to qualitative hedonism and its quantitative cousin), and can avoid classic challenges to qualitative hedonism that emerged in the post‐Mill era. If I succeed, this is a significant result for substantive value theory, given the dismissiveness with which qualitative hedonism is generally treated in the literature on the good.

中文翻译：

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对定性享乐主义的追求


在本文中，我试图阐明一种基于英国道德主义者价值理论的定性享乐主义。我认为这种观点是新颖的，与其他享乐主义（包括定性享乐主义及其定量同类的竞争方法）相比具有显着的优势，并且可以避免后穆勒时代出现的对定性享乐主义的经典挑战。如果我成功了，这对于实质性价值理论来说是一个重要的结果，因为在关于善的文献中普遍对定性享乐主义不屑一顾。