Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philosophical intuitions, inductivism has retaken its place as the most reasonable default position, while the skeptic is called on to supply a novel argument for his. The reason is as follows. There are certain possibilities concerning the functioning of the world that, if assigned positive credence, support inductivism. Prima facie, one might think that the alternatives to those possibilities, if assigned similar or more credence, cancel out that support. However, I argue that it is plausible that reasonable credence distributions are such that the alternatives at most cancel themselves out, and thus leave the support for inductivism intact.

某些关于未来的先前可信度分布导致归纳主义，而另一些则导致归纳怀疑论。我认为很难认为后者是合理的。我并没有证明它们不是，但在本文的最后，情况发生了逆转：根据前哲学直觉，归纳主义重新占据了最合理的默认位置，而怀疑论者则被要求提供对他来说这是一个新颖的论点。理由如下。关于世界运作的某些可能性，如果被赋予积极的可信度，就会支持归纳主义。乍一看，人们可能会认为这些可能性的替代方案，如果被赋予类似或更多的可信度，就会抵消这种支持。然而，我认为，合理的可信度分布使得替代方案最多可以自行抵消，从而使对归纳主义的支持完好无损，这是合理的。