Elizabeth Anscombe characterised practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. As Anscombe recognised, accepting this view involves rejecting certain basic orthodox epistemological assumptions. But even once this is done, a challenge remains for a conception of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. For while practical knowledge would appear to be a kind of propositional knowledge, intentions would appear to be a kind of non-propositional attitude. I call this the ‘Structural Challenge’ for an intention-based account of practical knowledge. After rejecting two suggested responses – one which views intentions as propositional attitudes; one which views practical knowledge as non-propositional knowledge – I offer my own solution by showing how simply having and carrying out an intention to φ will ordinarily meet a plausible neutral condition on propositional knowledge. Knowing a fact will in general involve being mentally related to it via a successful exercise of relevant concepts. The account I develop turns on viewing a person’s carrying out an intention to φ as their constituting the fact that they are φ-ing, through a practical exercise of their concept of φ-ing. The resulting account sheds light both on the analogies, and on the crucial formal differences, between practical and theoretical knowledge.

中文翻译：

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实用知识和结构性挑战


伊丽莎白·安斯科姆将实践知识描述为“有意图的”知识。正如安斯库姆所认识到的，接受这种观点就意味着拒绝某些基本的正统认识论假设。但即使做到了这一点，实践知识作为“意图”知识的概念仍然存在挑战。因为虽然实践知识似乎是一种命题知识，但意图似乎是一种非命题态度。我将其称为基于意图的实践知识解释的“结构挑战”。在拒绝了两种建议的回应之后——一种将意图视为命题态度；将实践知识视为非命题知识的人——我通过展示如何简单地拥有并执行对 φ 的意图通常会满足命题知识的合理中性条件，从而提供了自己的解决方案。了解事实通常需要通过成功运用相关概念来在心理上与之相关。我的解释转向将一个人对 φ 的意图视为他们通过实践其 φ-ing 概念而构成了他们正在 φ-ing 的事实。由此产生的说明既揭示了实践知识与理论知识之间的类比，也揭示了关键的形式差异。