It's plausible that we only fully appreciate the value of something, say a painting or a blameworthy action, when we have a fitting emotional response to it, such as admiration or guilt. But exactly how and why do we grasp value through emotion? I propose, first, that a subject S phenomenally grasps property P only if what it is to be P is manifest in the phenomenal character of S's experience. Second, following clues from the Stoics, I argue that the phenomenal character of emotional experience is constitutively linked with its having directive content. More precisely, emotional experience directs us both to adopt a maxim for action – take certain characteristic kinds of action for an emotion‐specific end – and to treat something about the object as a presumptively decisive reason to take such action for such end. If we assent to what the experience proposes (or rational control gets bypassed), we are motivated to take the relevant action and have a corresponding evaluative belief. This picture of emotional cognition yields a natural conception of the evaluative fittingness conditions of emotions without the problematic assumption that they have a presentational phenomenology. Instead, it is precisely in virtue of the directive and valenced phenomenology of emotion that values are only fully manifest in emotional experience, since values are essentially action‐ and attitude‐guiding properties.

中文翻译：

---

 情绪如何把握价值


似乎只有当我们对某件事物（例如一幅画或一个应受谴责的行为）产生适当的情感反应（例如钦佩或内疚）时，我们才会完全欣赏它的价值。但我们究竟如何以及为何通过情感来把握价值呢？首先，我提出，只有当主体 S 的经验的现象特征中显现出 P 的本质时，主体 S 才能在现象上掌握属性 P。其次，根据斯多葛学派的线索，我认为情感体验的现象特征与其具有指导性内容有着本质上的联系。更准确地说，情感经验引导我们采用行动准则——为特定情感的目的而采取某些特征性的行动——并将有关对象的某些东西视为采取这种行动以达到这种目的的推定决定性原因。如果我们同意经验的建议（或者理性控制被绕过），我们就会有动力采取相关行动并有相应的评价信念。情绪认知的这种图景产生了情绪评估适合性条件的自然概念，而没有产生情绪具有表象现象学的有问题的假设。相反，正是凭借情感的指导性和价态现象学，价值观只能在情感体验中得到充分体现，因为价值观本质上是行动和态度的指导属性。