Both actions and beliefs are subject to normative evaluation as rational or irrational. As such, we might expect there to be some general, unified story about what makes them rational. However, orthodox approaches suggest that the rationality of action is determined by practical considerations, while the rationality of belief is determined by properly epistemic considerations. This apparent disunity leads some, like Rinard (2019), to reject orthodox theories of the rationality of belief in favor of pragmatism. In this paper, I argue we should reject pragmatist approaches to unifying the rationality of action and belief. Instead, I argue, we should embrace a correctness‐based view of rationality, on which rationality is fundamentally about getting things correct as best we can, given our epistemic limitations. On such a view, the facts about rational action and belief are a function of the facts about correct action and belief. I contend that the apparent disunity of orthodox theories is created by the fact that action and belief have different correctness conditions. Nevertheless, on the correctness‐based view, this disunity is merely apparent. This renders pragmatism's revisionary implications for the rationality of belief unnecessary to take on in order unify it with the rationality of action.

中文翻译：

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没有实用主义的统一


行为和信念都受到理性或非理性的规范评价。因此，我们可能期望有一些普遍的、统一的故事来解释是什么让它们变得理性。然而，正统方法认为，行动的合理性是由实际考虑决定的，而信仰的合理性是由适当的认知考虑决定的。这种明显的不统一导致一些人，如 Rinard (2019)，拒绝信仰合理性的正统理论，转而支持实用主义。在本文中，我认为我们应该拒绝实用主义的方法来统一行动和信仰的合理性。相反，我认为，我们应该接受一种基于正确性的理性观，根据这种观点，理性从根本上说是在考虑到我们的认知局限性的情况下，尽可能地让事情正确。根据这种观点，关于理性行动和信念的事实是关于正确行动和信念的事实的函数。我认为，正统理论的明显不统一是由于行动和信念具有不同的正确性条件这一事实造成的。然而，从基于正确性的观点来看，这种不统一只是表面上的。这使得实用主义对信仰合理性的修正意义没有必要承担，以便将其与行动合理性统一起来。