I argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy. Nevertheless, level‐incoherent combinations exhibit a distinctive tension, and this tension has been thought by many to indicate that level‐incoherence is always irrational. Although this idea has proved resilient, I argue that it is incorrect. I evaluate three candidate explanations for the distinctive tension exhibited by level‐incoherent combinations, only one of which is the traditional view (which I call the ‘Prohibition View’) that epistemic level‐incoherence is prohibited by epistemic rationality. I argue instead for the ‘Inquiry View’, according to which level‐incoherence is not rationally criticisable but is a reason to undertake further inquiry.

中文翻译：

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 不连贯的价值


我认为，层次不连贯在一组特定的认知环境中具有认知价值：在这些环境中，很容易获得关于认知理性规范要求的合理错误信念。我认为，在这些环境中，层次不连贯是理性占主导地位的策略。然而，层次不连贯的组合表现出一种独特的张力，许多人认为这种张力表明层次不连贯总是不合理的。尽管这个想法被证明是有弹性的，但我认为它是不正确的。我评估了三种对水平不连贯组合所表现出的独特张力的候选解释，其中只有一种是传统观点（我称之为“禁止观点”），即认知理性禁止认知水平不连贯。相反，我主张“探究观点”，根据这种观点，层次上的不连贯性不能在理性上受到批评，但却是进行进一步探究的一个理由。