What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti‐normativism). I argue against both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity.

中文翻译：

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信念困境和认知归咎


当认知和实践原因背道而驰时，我们应该相信什么？传统观点认为，有些东西我们应该在认知上相信，有些东西我们实际上应该（让我们自己）相信，就这样。最近的一些论述挑战了这一观点，要么认为有一些东西我们应该更简单地相信，考虑所有认知和实践原因（权衡观点），要么完全否认认知原因的规范性（认知反规范主义）。我反对这两种说法并捍卫传统观点。在信念困境中，代理人可能会因遵守其实际原因而不是其认知原因而受到指责。这揭示了认知原因如何规范：认知归咎的概念帮助我们追踪认知规范性。