Some random processes, like a series of coin flips, can produce outcomes that seem particularly remarkable or striking. This paper explores an epistemic puzzle that arises when thinking about these outcomes and asking what, if anything, we can justifiably believe about them. The puzzle has no obvious solution, and any theory of epistemic justification will need to contend with it sooner or later. The puzzle proves especially useful for bringing out the differences between three prominent theories; the probabilist theory, the normic theory and a theory recently defended by Goodman and Salow.

中文翻译：

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合理性、常态性和随机性


一些随机过程，例如一系列抛硬币，可以产生看起来特别引人注目或引人注目的结果。本文探讨了在思考这些结果时出现的一个认知难题，并询问我们可以合理地相信它们的什么（如果有的话）。这个难题没有明显的解决方案，任何认知论证理论迟早都需要面对它。事实证明，这个谜题对于揭示三种著名理论之间的差异特别有用。概率论、规范理论以及古德曼和萨洛最近捍卫的理论。