Corporate ESG performance is increasingly recognized as crucial for sustainable development, yet the impact of CEO behavior on this metric remains understudied. This paper investigates how CEO hedging affects corporate ESG performance, addressing a significant gap in the literature. Using data from U.S. listed companies from 2013 to 2021, we employ regression analysis and propensity score matching to examine this relationship. Our findings reveal that CEO hedging significantly reduces corporate ESG performance. Further analysis shows that the CEO's shareholding ratio and corporate risk enhance this negative correlation, while external supervision mitigates it. Heterogeneity analysis indicates a stronger correlation in low-polluting enterprises. These results underscore the ethical implications of CEO option trading for personal risk hedging and highlight the importance of avoiding behaviors that can adversely affect a firm's ESG performance. Our study contributes to the understanding of corporate governance and sustainable development, offering valuable insights for policymakers and corporate leaders in designing effective strategies to enhance ESG performance.

中文翻译：

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CEO 对冲对企业 ESG 绩效的影响：来自美国的证据


企业 ESG 绩效越来越被认为对可持续发展至关重要，但 CEO 行为对这一指标的影响仍未得到充分研究。本文研究了 CEO 对冲如何影响公司 ESG 绩效，解决了文献中的重大差距。使用 2013 年至 2021 年美国上市公司的数据，我们采用回归分析和倾向得分匹配来研究这种关系。我们的研究结果表明，CEO 对冲会显著降低企业 ESG 绩效。进一步分析表明，首席执行官的持股比例和公司风险增强了这种负相关，而外部监督则减轻了这种负相关。异质性分析表明，低污染企业之间的相关性更强。这些结果强调了 CEO 期权交易对个人风险对冲的道德影响，并强调了避免可能对公司 ESG 绩效产生不利影响的行为的重要性。我们的研究有助于理解公司治理和可持续发展，为政策制定者和企业领导者设计有效的战略以提高 ESG 绩效提供宝贵的见解。