After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more” or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose more than equality: the Kamm/Scanlon “Balancing Argument” rests on what social choice theorists call “(Positive) Responsiveness,” Kamm’s “Aggregation Argument” assumes that “equal” lives are fungible, and Hsieh et al. have it that spreading goods broadly best approximates equality. In each case, the crucial premise is not equality itself but a further idea that Taurek, I argue, can safely reject. I conclude with a conjecture: there is no theory–neutral argument that settles the question of whether the numbers count.

经过 50 年的争​​论，聚合伦理学陷入了奇怪的僵局，双方都认为只有他们的理论才能平等对待人。我认为，在平等问题上，双方都有错。从“各为一”的前提出发，我们不能得出“多则多”的结论或者其否定。从平等到聚合的常见论证不仅仅以平等为前提：卡姆/斯坎伦的“平衡论证”基于社会选择理论家所说的“（积极）反应”，卡姆的“聚合论证”假设“平等”的生活是可替代的，而谢家等人。广泛传播商品最接近平等。在每种情况下，关键的前提不是平等本身，而是陶雷克可以放心拒绝的进一步想法。我得出一个猜想：没有任何理论中立的论证可以解决这些数字是否重要的​​问题。