Initially, you judge that p. You then learn that most experts disagree. All things considered, you believe that the experts are probably right. Still, p continues to seem right to you, in some sense. You don’t yet see what, if anything, is wrong with your original reasoning. In such a case, we’ll say that you are ‘inclined’ toward p. This paper explores various roles that this state of inclination can play, both within epistemology and more broadly. Specifically, it will be argued that: (i) inclinations can promote the accuracy of inquiring groups; (ii) they can support rational participation within philosophy despite pervasive disagreement; (iii) they allow us to make sense of an important way in which two people can continue to disagree even after they ‘conciliate’; (iv) inclinations carry information about individuals’ independent judgments and for this reason must be accounted for when updating on the opinions of others; (v) inclinations are connected to understanding in a way that belief is not; (vi) and awareness of the inclination-belief distinction enables us to respond to a provocative challenge purporting to show that critical thinking, or ‘thinking for oneself’, typically reduces expected accuracy and hence should be discouraged.

中文翻译：

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倾向的六种角色


最初，您判断p。然后你就会知道大多数专家不同意。考虑到所有因素，您认为专家可能是对的。尽管如此，从某种意义上说，p 对你来说仍然是正确的。你还没有看出你最初的推理有什么问题（如果有的话）。在这种情况下，我们会说你“倾向于”p。本文探讨了这种倾向状态在认识论和更广泛的范围内可以发挥的各种作用。具体来说，有人认为：（i）倾向可以提高询问群体的准确性； (ii) 尽管普遍存在分歧，他们仍能支持哲学领域的理性参与； (iii) 它们使我们能够理解一种重要的方式，即两个人即使在“和解”之后仍然可以继续存在分歧； (iv) 倾向包含有关个人独立判断的信息，因此在更新他人的意见时必须予以考虑； (v) 倾向与理解的联系方式与信念不同； (vi) 以及对倾向与信念区别的认识使我们能够应对挑衅性挑战，该挑战旨在表明批判性思维或“为自己思考”通常会降低预期的准确性，因此应该予以阻止。