Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks’ willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks, which are more frequently named in RPE, hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers receive smaller and fewer loans and face higher spreads. Our results highlight the tension between the normal benefits of competition versus the need for cooperation in loan syndication. (JEL G21, G24, G30, M12)

中文翻译：

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银团贷款、竞争和相对绩效评估


相对绩效评估（RPE）将高管薪酬与竞争对手的利润挂钩，从而加剧了竞争压力。我们表明，这些合同降低了银行参与 RPE 合同中指定银行承保贷款的意愿，从而使银团贷款变得更加困难。牵头安排银行在 RPE 中被更频繁地提及，在其银团贷款中持有较大份额，而借款人获得的贷款越来越少，并面临更高的利差。我们的结果凸显了竞争的正常收益与银团贷款合作的需要之间的紧张关系。 （捷尔 G21、G24、G30、M12）