We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper’s empirical predictions. We extend the “conceptual” and “operational” levels of Libby boxes by adding an “analytical” level to offer a tool for assessing and developing the link between theoretical models and empirical tests.

中文翻译：

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独角兽探索：从理论中得出实证预测


我们讨论了 Feng et al. （2024），它研究了委托投资的动态模型。本文为委托人和代理人之间的最佳合同提供了新颖的见解，代理人获取有关投资机会的时间和盈利能力的私人信息。虽然分析分析提供了有趣的发现，但我们对论文实证预测的有效性感到担忧。我们通过添加“分析”级别来扩展 Libby 盒子的“概念”和“操作”级别，以提供评估和发展理论模型和实证测试之间联系的工具。