We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper’s empirical predictions. We extend the “conceptual” and “operational” levels of Libby boxes by adding an “analytical” level to offer a tool for assessing and developing the link between theoretical models and empirical tests.

中文翻译：

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独角兽探索：从理论中得出经验预测


我们讨论冯等人。 （2024），研究委托投资的动态模型。该论文对委托人和代理人之间的最优合同提供了新颖的见解，代理人获得了有关投资机会的时间和盈利能力的私人信息。虽然分析分析提供了有趣的发现，但我们对论文实证预测的有效性表示担忧。我们通过添加“分析”级别来扩展 Libby 盒子的“概念”和“操作”级别，以提供评估和开发理论模型与实证测试之间联系的工具。