Retired battery recycling and information leakage prevention under blockchain introduction intertwine in the new energy vehicle (NEVs) supply chain, but rare literature has jointly investigated them. Therefore, we characterize the vehicle goodwill under recycling and marketing efforts as well as the automobile demand function with and without blockchain introduction, identify the long-run discounted profits of the manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain, and investigate the Stackelberg differential game equilibrium under four scenarios: no blockchain introduction, manufacturer introduction, manufacturer-retailer cooperative introduction, and cooperative introduction plus wholesale price discounts for preventing information leakage. The results show that the manufacturer can introduce blockchain when costs are below a certain threshold, which increases the recycling rate of decommissioned batteries and improves goodwill, consumer demand, and marginal profits for the manufacturer and retailer; the retailer participation in the introduction of blockchain solves the free-rider problem and reduces the thresholds introduced, but does not affect battery recycling, goodwill, consumer demand, and wholesale and retail prices; wholesale price discounts effectively discourage the retailer from leaking information about the manufacturer and lead to improved profits for the retailer, but results in higher earnings for the manufacturer only when discounts are below a certain threshold.

中文翻译：

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新能源汽车供应链中区块链技术下电池回收与信息泄露预防协调


区块链引入下的退役电池回收和信息泄漏预防在新能源汽车 （NEV） 供应链中交织在一起，但很少有文献对它们进行联合调查。因此，我们描述了回收和营销工作下的车辆商誉以及有和没有区块链引入的汽车需求函数，确定了制造商和零售商在供应链中的长期折扣利润，并研究了四种情况下的 Stackelberg 微分博弈均衡：无区块链引入、制造商引入、制造商-零售商合作引入和合作引入加批发防止信息泄露的价格折扣。结果表明，当成本低于一定阈值时，制造商可以引入区块链，从而提高退役电池的回收率，提高制造商和零售商的商誉、消费者需求和边际利润;零售商参与引入区块链解决了搭便车问题并降低了引入的门槛，但不会影响电池回收、商誉、消费者需求以及批发和零售价格;批发价格折扣可以有效地阻止零售商泄露有关制造商的信息，从而提高零售商的利润，但只有当折扣低于特定阈值时，才会为制造商带来更高的收入。