How do states react to adverse decisions resulting from human rights treaties’ individual complaint procedures? While recent scholarship has shown particular interest in states’ reactions to international court judgments, research on state behavior vis-à-vis an increasing treaty body output remains scarce. I argue that states generally want to avoid the costs implied by adverse decisions, or ‘views’. Rising numbers of rebukes lead them to update their beliefs about the costliness of complaint procedure acceptance in a Bayesian manner. As a result, states become less inclined to accept further petition mechanisms under different human rights treaties. I test these assumptions on an original dataset containing information on individual complaint procedure acceptance and the distribution of 1320 views for a total number of 169 countries ranging from the year 1965 to 2018. Results from Cox proportional hazards regressions suggest that both the number of views against neighboring states and against the examined state itself decrease the likelihood of acceptance of most of the six individual complaint procedures under observation. I also find evidence that this effect is exacerbated if states are more likely to actually bear the costs of implementation. Findings indicate that the omission of further commitment can be a negative spillover of the treaty bodies’ quasi-judicial output.

各国如何应对人权条约个人申诉程序造成的不利决定？虽然最近的学术研究对国家对国际法院判决的反应表现出特别的兴趣，但针对条约机构不断增加的产出的国家行为研究仍然很少。我认为，各国通常希望避免不利决定或“观点”所隐含的成本。越来越多的谴责导致他们更新了对以贝叶斯方式接受投诉程序的成本的看法。结果，各国变得不太愿意接受不同人权条约下的进一步请愿机制。我在原始数据集上测试了这些假设，该原始数据集包含个人投诉程序接受情况的信息以及 1965 年至 2018 年期间 169 个国家/地区的 1320 个视图的分布情况。Cox 比例风险回归的结果表明，针对邻国以及针对被审查国本身降低了接受观察中的六个个人申诉程序中的大多数程序的可能性。我还发现证据表明，如果各州更有可能实际承担实施成本，这种影响就会加剧。调查结果表明，省略进一步承诺可能会对条约机构的准司法产出产生负面溢出效应。