The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value depends on. The debate’s reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back a ‘forgotten’ distinction between two ways in which value can depend on other properties. We should distinguish those properties in virtue of which a value is had—the grounds of the value—from those on condition of which it is had—which following Dancy I call the enablers of the value. With this distinction in hand, I offer a clear re-statement of the two main conditionalist accounts of final value: non-instrumentalism and non-derivatism. When understood not as making claims about the properties on which final value depends but rather as making more specific ones about the properties that ground final value, these accounts are perfectly coherent.

迄今为止，关于最终价值的争论一直被理解为关于最终价值取决于哪种属性的争论。我认为，辩论对纯粹依赖的依赖使得条件主义者很难提出内在主义的连贯的积极替代方案。关于依赖的讨论过于粗粒度，无法区分价值在形而上学上依赖于价值承载者的其他属性的不同方式。为了解决这个问题，我建议我们恢复价值依赖于其他属性的两种方式之间“被遗忘”的区别。我们应该区分那些拥有价值的属性（价值的基础）和拥有价值的条件（按照丹西的说法，我将其称为价值的推动者）。有了这种区别，我对最终价值的两个主要条件主义解释进行了明确的重申：非工具主义和非衍生主义。当理解为不是对最终价值所依赖的属性提出主张，而是对最终价值所依赖的属性做出更具体的主张时，这些说法是完全连贯的。