I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgements about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational to perform. Moreover, the significance of anger to practical rationality informs how we should regulate anger, especially the anger of others. Along these lines, I argue that it is wrong to prevent anger to the extent that this prevents someone's possession of reasons to intervene, and it is right to provoke anger to the extent that this enables someone's possession of reasons to intervene.

中文翻译：

---

愤怒如何帮助我们拥有行动的理由


我认为愤怒可以帮助我们拥有干预他人的理由。这是因为适当的愤怒会让我们根据理由干预他人。我认为愤怒是一种似乎使这种干预合理化的原因的呈现，就像感知体验是一种似乎使我们对环境的判断合理化的原因的呈现一样。这样，愤怒可以帮助我们拥有理由，使具体行动变得合理。此外，愤怒对实践理性的重要性告诉我们应该如何调节愤怒，尤其是他人的愤怒。沿着这些思路，我认为，阻止愤怒到阻止某人拥有干预理由的程度是错误的，而激发愤怒到使某人拥有干预理由的程度是正确的。