We develop a general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs. The key novelty is the way in which the banking system’s assets and liabilities are connected. Banks issue loans to entrepreneurs who sell goods to households, which in turn pay for the goods by redeeming bank deposits. The return on bank assets is thus contingent on households being able to withdraw their deposits. In a run, not all households that wish to consume manage to withdraw, since part of banks’ cash reserves end up in the hands of households without consumption needs. This misallocation of liquidity lowers revenues of entrepreneurs and bank asset returns, thereby rationalising the run. Interventions that restrict redemptions in a run can be self-defeating due to their negative effect on demand in goods markets. We show how runs can sometimes be prevented with combinations of deposit freezes and redemption penalties as well as with the provision of emergency liquidity.

中文翻译：

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无总体风险的系统性银行挤兑：流动性配置不当如何引发偿付能力危机


我们开发了一个自我实现的银行挤兑的一般均衡模型。关键的新颖之处在于银行系统资产和负债的连接方式。银行向向家庭出售商品的企业家发放贷款，而家庭又通过赎回银行存款来支付商品费用。因此，银行资产的回报取决于家庭能否提取存款。总之，并非所有希望消费的家庭都能够退出，因为银行的部分现金储备最终落入了没有消费需求的家庭手中。这种流动性的错误配置降低了企业家的收入和银行资产回报，从而使挤兑合理化。由于对商品市场需求的负面影响，连续限制赎回的干预措施可能会弄巧成拙。我们展示了有时如何通过存款冻结和赎回罚款以及提供紧急流动性的组合来防止挤兑。