Moderate (or ‘limited’) rebel goals and inclusive political institutions have been suggested to increase the chances of rebel–government negotiations. This article attempts to shed light on the politics of rebel–government negotiations by presenting new, systematic data on the scope of rebel goals and demonstrating both theoretically and empirically that it is the interaction of moderate rebel goals and inclusive political institutions – rather than each variable in isolation – that helps disputants overcome bargaining problems and engage in negotiations. Particularly, the article contends that while moderate rebel goals allow the disputants to recognize that negotiations may be mutually beneficial, the presence of a dual commitment problem – where rebel groups and governments are both concerned about the opponent’s commitment to negotiated settlements – hinders them from negotiating. In such cases, the institutional features of polyarchy, defined by Dahl as competitive and inclusive elections accompanied by civil liberties, alleviate this dual commitment problem and induce moderate rebels and the government to follow through with their incentives to negotiate. Statistical results from newly collected data on rebel group goals and rebel–government negotiations support this claim: rebel–government negotiations are significantly more likely to occur when rebel groups espouse moderate goals and the level of polyarchy in a country is sufficiently high. Results indicate that the influence of rebel goals and institutions on negotiations is better understood in conjunction.

中文翻译：

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解决国内冲突中的讨价还价问题：目标、机构和谈判


有人建议，适度（或“有限”）的叛乱目标和包容性的政治制度可以增加叛乱政府与政府谈判的机会。本文试图通过提供关于叛乱目标范围的新的、系统的数据，并从理论上和实证上证明，这是温和的叛乱目标和包容性政治制度的相互作用，而不是每个变量的相互作用，从而阐明叛乱与政府谈判的政治。孤立地——这有助于争议双方克服讨价还价问题并参与谈判。特别是，文章认为，虽然温和的叛乱目标使争议双方认识到谈判可能是互惠互利的，但双重承诺问题的存在——叛乱团体和政府都担心对手对谈判解决方案的承诺——阻碍了他们进行谈判。在这种情况下，达尔将多头政治的制度特征定义为竞争性和包容性的选举以及公民自由，缓解了这种双重承诺问题，并促使温和的叛乱分子和政府履行他们的谈判动机。新收集的关于叛乱组织目标和叛军与政府谈判数据的统计结果支持了这一说法：当叛乱组织拥护温和的目标并且一个国家的多头政治水平足够高时，叛军与政府谈判的可能性要大得多。结果表明，结合起来可以更好地理解叛乱目标和机构对谈判的影响。