The landscape of future mobile devices is poised for an organic fusion of sensing and communication, a trend known as integrated sensing and communication. In this letter, we stand in attacker’s perspective and conceive a novel physical layer attack termed sensing-resistant jamming (SRJ), aiming at maximally disrupting the suspicious transmission while deceiving receiver’s detection of the attacker’s direction simultaneously. To evaluate the sensing-resistant performance, a metric named angular-domain peak-to-average ratio (ADPAR) is defined and further analyzed through the generalized Rayleigh quotient. Then, the SRJ design is formulated by minimizing the achievable rate under ADPAR constraints, which is converted to a convex problem and solved by the projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm. In order to further reduce the computational complexity, we also provide a sub-optimal closed-form solution. Simulation results illustrate the feasibility of the conceived SRJ design, where the attacker’s direction can be concealed while maintaining the achievable rate to a low level.

中文翻译：

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抗感知干扰：ISAC 网络中的一种新型物理层攻击


未来移动设备的前景将迎来传感和通信的有机融合，这一趋势被称为集成传感和通信。在这封信中，我们站在攻击者的角度，构想了一种称为抗感应干扰 （SRJ） 的新型物理层攻击，旨在最大限度地破坏可疑传输，同时欺骗接收器对攻击者方向的检测。为了评估抗传感性能，定义了一个名为角域峰均比 （ADPAR） 的指标，并通过广义瑞利商进一步分析。然后，通过在 ADPAR 约束下最小化可实现的速率来制定 SRJ 设计，并将其转换为凸问题并通过投影梯度下降 （PGD） 算法求解。为了进一步降低计算复杂性，我们还提供了一个次优的闭式解决方案。仿真结果说明了构思的 SRJ 设计的可行性，其中攻击者的方向可以隐藏，同时将可实现的速率保持在较低水平。