Are states more interested in claiming territories that have economic resources? While previous theories of international relations assume that resources make a territory more tempting to claim, all else equal, I argue that certain types of economic resources can make states less willing to claim a territory. The presence of capital-intensive resources—such as oil or minerals—raises concerns about how the benefits of acquiring the territory would be distributed within the nation. These distributional concerns make it harder and costlier for leaders to mobilize widespread and consistent support for claiming resource-rich lands. Using original geocoded data on territorial claims in South America from 1830 to 2001, I show that states are indeed less likely to claim lands that have oil or minerals, even when they can be claimed for historical or administrative reasons. I then illustrate the theoretical mechanism through a case study of Bolivia, comparing Bolivian attitudes toward reclaiming its two lost provinces, the Chaco and the Litoral. By showing how the presence of economic resources can become a liability in mobilizing unified support, this paper questions the widespread assumption that resources make territories more desirable to claim.

国家是否对拥有经济资源的领土更感兴趣？虽然以前的国际关系理论假设资源使领土更具吸引力，但在其他条件相同的情况下，我认为某些类型的经济资源会使国家不太愿意声称拥有领土。资本密集型资源（如石油或矿产）的存在引发了人们对收购领土的好处如何在国内分配的担忧。这些分配问题使领导者更难、更昂贵地动员广泛和一致的支持来主张资源丰富的土地。使用 1830 年至 2001 年南美洲领土主张的原始地理编码数据，我表明各州确实不太可能声称拥有石油或矿产的土地，即使它们可以出于历史或行政原因提出要求。然后，我通过玻利维亚的案例研究来说明理论机制，比较玻利维亚对收复其两个失去的省份——查科省和沿海省份的态度。通过展示经济资源的存在如何成为动员统一支持的负担，本文质疑了资源使领土更可取的普遍假设。