A large literature has argued that domestic competition increases a militant organization's use and severity of terrorism to differentiate their “brand” and “outbid” other organizations. However, most empirical analyses infer such competition from the quantity of groups present in a geographic area. This approach neglects specific group relationships, such as cooperation, rhetorical or violent rivalry, or peaceful coexistence. We introduce a behavioral measure of group competition and argue that variation in the quality, rather than the quantity, of competition affects the violence profile of militant groups in unexpected ways. Violent competition, where militants attack one another, imposes significant constraints on group resources and increases groups’ dependence on civilian support, which exacerbates the costs of a popular backlash against brutality. Moreover, violent competition effectively substitutes for crowding out rivals via outbidding. As competition becomes extreme, we posit that groups increasingly opt for a strategy of terrorist restraint and reduce the share of high-profile attacks on soft civilian targets. We test this argument at the macro and micro levels with cross-national data on 290 organizations in civil war (1970–2018) and granular data on the subnational targeting strategy of the Islamic State in Syria (2013–2018). Both analyses provide robust support for our argument. The findings shed light on the strategic limitations of outbidding and provide important insights for research and policy.

中文翻译：

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暴力竞争与恐怖主义抑制


大量文献认为，国内竞争增加了激进组织对恐怖主义的使用和严重性，以使其“品牌”脱颖而出并“出价高于”其他组织。然而，大多数实证分析都是根据某个地理区域中存在的群体数量来推断这种竞争。这种方法忽视了特定的群体关系，例如合作、言辞或暴力竞争，或和平共处。我们引入了群体竞争的行为衡量标准，并认为竞争的质量而不是数量的变化会以意想不到的方式影响激进组织的暴力状况。武装分子相互攻击的暴力竞争严重限制了团体资源，增加了团体对平民支持的依赖，从而加剧了民众反对暴行的成本。此外，暴力竞争有效地替代了通过竞价排挤竞争对手。随着竞争变得极端，我们认为组织越来越多地选择克制恐怖分子的战略，并减少对软平民目标的高调袭击的比例。我们利用内战（1970-2018）中 290 个组织的跨国数据以及叙利亚伊斯兰国地方目标战略（2013-2018）的详细数据，从宏观和微观层面检验了这一论点。这两项分析都为我们的论点提供了强有力的支持。研究结果揭示了出价过高的战略局限性，并为研究和政策提供了重要见解。