Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects persist by enduring rather than perduring. Second, that most people have a view of change on which enduring but not perduring objects count as changing. Third, that one reason why the folk represent time as dynamical is because it seems to them, and they believe that, they endure through time. We found no evidence to support these claims. While there are certainly plenty of ‘folk’ endurantists in the population we tested, there are also plenty of ‘folk’ perdurantists. We did not find robust evidence that a majority of people believed that, or it seemed to them as though, objects endure rather than perdure. We conclude that many arguments in favour of endurantism that appeal to folk beliefs about, or experiences of, persisting objects and change rest on views about those beliefs and experiences that are empirically unsupported. There is no evidence to suggest that endurantism is the folk friendly view of persistence, and so we should stop treating it as such without argument.

许多哲学家认为，我们的民间或前反思的持久性观点是一种让物体持久存在的观点。这一假设不仅在关于持久性本身本质的争论中发挥作用，而且还被用于形而上学的其他几个领域，包括关于变化和时间流逝的本质的争论。在本文中，我们通过实证检验了三种广泛的主张。首先，大多数人（即大多数非哲学家）相信，并且在他们看来，物体是通过持久而不是持久而持续存在的。其次，大多数人对变化有一种看法，认为持久但不持久的物体才算变化。第三，人们将时间表示为动态的原因之一是因为在他们看来，并且他们相信，时间能够持续存在。我们没有发现任何证据支持这些说法。虽然我们测试的人群中肯定有很多“民间”持久主义者，但也有很多“民间”持久主义者。我们没有找到强有力的证据表明大多数人相信，或者在他们看来，物体是持久的，而不是持久的。我们得出的结论是，许多支持持久主义的论点诉诸于关于持久性客体和变化的民间信仰或经验，这些论点都是基于对那些在经验上不受支持的信仰和经验的看法。没有证据表明忍耐主义是民间友好的坚持观点，因此我们应该停止毫无争议地对待它。