Subsidiary general manager (GM) succession selection is a critical process in multinational enterprises (MNEs). Previous research, grounded in organizational learning and routines, has suggested that GM succession dynamics typically follow either an acceleration or a deceleration momentum. However, as we investigated succession decision-making heuristics through interviews with MNE managers, we observed neither acceleration nor deceleration. Instead, we found some consistent succession dynamics. Within this consistency, we found variations in decision-making models among subsidiaries—some adopting a rule-based approach with a short succession dynamic, some adopting a goal-based approach with a moderate succession dynamic, and others adopting a people-based approach with a long succession dynamic. Underlying these models were bounded rationality, bounded reliability, and their unexpected interactions. Our study sheds light on the critical role of managers in subsidiary management, enriches international business theorizing on the subsidiary GM succession process, and refines the boundary conditions of organizational learning. The central message is that looking solely at GM succession dynamics through an organizational learning lens may risk overlooking relevant causal mechanisms. To make the theorizing on the dynamics of subsidiary management more fertile, the behavioral model should account for the idiosyncrasies of decision-making as well as the heuristics of decision-makers.

子公司总经理（GM）继任者选择是跨国企业（MNE）的一个关键过程。先前基于组织学习和惯例的研究表明，通用汽车的继任动态通常遵循加速或减速势头。然而，当我们通过采访跨国公司经理来研究继任决策启发法时，我们既没有观察到加速，也没有观察到减速。相反，我们发现了一些一致的继任动态。在这种一致性中，我们发现子公司之间的决策模型存在差异——一些子公司采用基于规则的方法，具有较短的继任动态，一些采用基于目标的方法，具有中等的继任动态，而其他公司则采用以人为本的方法，具有中等的继任动态。长期连续动态。这些模型的基础是有限理性、有限可靠性以及它们意想不到的相互作用。我们的研究揭示了管理者在子公司管理中的关键作用，丰富了关于子公司总经理继任过程的国际商业理论，并完善了组织学习的边界条件。中心信息是，仅通过组织学习的视角来看待总经理继任动态可能会忽视相关的因果机制。为了使关于子公司管理动态的理论更加丰富，行为模型应该考虑决策的特质以及决策者的启发。