This paper analyses the unique hybrid governance of Brazil’s Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM) in regulating soybean production in the Amazon, where private actors have created a state-like ban on commodity production to reduce deforestation that goes beyond national law. Despite existing research regarding impact assessment, the study aims to fill knowledge gaps in explaining the ASM’s alliance-building processes, its longstanding maintenance, and its potential for regulatory replicability. Informed by the application of the Baptist and Bootlegger political economic theory of regulation and empirical data from qualitative interviews and document analysis, we provide an actor-centered explanation of the design, adoption, and maintenance of the ASM over a 19-year timeframe. Our results show how NGOs and businesses had opposite motivations and negotiated their roles to form a successful strategic alliance, reinforced by the inclusion of third parties (e.g., technical and governmental actors) to assist in its monitoring and transparency. Developed as an exclusive private market regulation, the ASM agreement, however, relies on a policy mix: private and public actors play a role in implementation, which includes assisting and relying on existing public policies, instruments, and official data. This policy mix was necessary for the ASM’s noteworthy hybrid and long-term governance. Its successful formation in 2006 was enabled by factors including an economic crisis, foreign pressure linked with national enforcement failure, and, most importantly, the Amazon scope. Our analysis shows who gains or loses from the regulatory design. Furthermore, we shed light on the biggest regulatory spillover, to the Cerrado, where the failed attempt at replicability emphasizes the regulatory uniqueness of the ASM. The study concludes with a discussion of what will help or hinder the ASM’s longevity, providing lessons for similar regulatory mechanisms on forest-risk agricultural production, such as EU’s recent Regulation on Deforestation-free Products.

中文翻译：

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监管政治和混合治理：巴西亚马逊大豆暂停令案例


本文分析了巴西亚马逊大豆暂停令（ASM）在监管亚马逊大豆生产方面的独特混合治理，其中私人行为者制定了类似于国家的商品生产禁令，以减少超出国家法律范围的森林砍伐。尽管现有有关影响评估的研究，但该研究旨在填补知识空白，解释 ASM 的联盟建设过程、其长期维护及其监管可复制性的潜力。根据浸信会和盗版者政治经济监管理论的应用以及来自定性访谈和文件分析的经验数据，我们对 ASM 在 19 年时间范围内的设计、采用和维护提供了以参与者为中心的解释。我们的结果表明，非政府组织和企业如何具有相反的动机并协商各自的角色以形成成功的战略联盟，并通过第三方（例如技术和政府行为者）的参与来协助其监控和提高透明度，从而得到加强。然而，ASM 协议是作为一项排他性的私人市场监管而制定的，它依赖于政策组合：私人和公共行为者在实施中发挥作用，其中包括协助和依赖现有的公共政策、工具和官方数据。这种政策组合对于 ASM 值得注意的混合和长期治理是必要的。它于 2006 年成功成立，得益于多种因素，包括经济危机、与国家执法失败相关的外国压力，以及最重要的亚马逊范围。我们的分析表明谁从监管设计中获益或受损。 此外，我们还揭示了对塞拉多最大的监管溢出效应，其中复制性尝试的失败强调了 ASM 的监管独特性。该研究最后讨论了哪些因素将有助于或阻碍手工小规模农业的长期发展，为森林风险农业生产的类似监管机制提供经验教训，例如欧盟最近的《无毁林产品法规》。