Research summaryAlthough society benefits when people with criminal records are employed, employers are reluctant to hire them. Can we diminish this reluctance with direct incentives that reduce the cost of employing record‐holders or that compensate for the associated risk? If so, will the beneficial effects of incentives emerge under traditional hiring, where job applicants disclose criminal history information at the application stage, and under Ban‐the‐Box, where they do not? To answer these questions, we conducted two preregistered experiments with a national sample of hiring decision‐makers (n = 1,000). The first was a conjoint analysis where participants chose between applicants who randomly varied on eight attributes, including criminal record (n = 13,998 choices). It corresponded to traditional hiring, where applicants’ criminal records are available at the outset. The second experiment involved a series of picture‐based factorial vignettes depicting tentatively hired employees later discovered to have records (n = 3,989 decisions). It approximated Ban‐the‐Box. In both experiments, a $2,400 tax credit and $25,000 insurance against losses from employee dishonesty reduced participants’ reluctance to hire record‐holders. Rehabilitation certificates also had beneficial effects under Ban‐the‐Box.Policy implicationsAcross two experiments, we found that a $2,400 tax credit and $25,000 insurance both reduced participants’ reluctance to hire record‐holders; they did so under traditional hiring and Ban‐the‐Box, and they did so regardless of whether applicants had misdemeanor or felony convictions. The clear policy implication is that employers should receive both incentives. Two federal programs, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit and the Federal Bonding Program, currently offer similar incentives, but neither program is used widely. Our findings indicate that steps should be taken to increase their use and to expand them. Because rehabilitation certificates were also helpful for getting record‐holders hired, steps should be taken to increase their use as well.

中文翻译：

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直接激励措施可能会增加有犯罪记录的人的就业


研究摘要 尽管雇用有犯罪记录的人会给社会带来好处，但雇主却不愿意雇用他们。我们能否通过直接激励措施来减少这种不情愿，从而降低雇用记录持有者的成本或补偿相关风险？如果是这样，在传统招聘（求职者在申请阶段披露犯罪记录信息）和“禁令”招聘（求职者不披露犯罪记录信息）的情况下，激励措施的有益效果是否会显现出来？为了回答这些问题，我们对全国招聘决策者样本（n = 1,000）进行了两项预先注册的实验。第一个是联合分析，参与者在八个属性（包括犯罪记录）上随机变化的申请人之间进行选择（n = 13,998 个选择）。它与传统的招聘相对应，即从一开始就可以获得申请人的犯罪记录。第二个实验涉及一系列基于图片的阶乘小插图，描述了后来发现有记录的临时雇用的员工（n = 3,989 个决策）。它近似于 Ban-the-Box。在这两项实验中，2,400 美元的税收抵免和 25,000 美元的员工不诚实损失保险降低了参与者雇用记录保持者的意愿。康复证书在 Ban-the-Box 下也产生了有益的影响。政策影响 通过两项实验，我们发现 2,400 美元的税收抵免和 25,000 美元的保险都降低了参与者雇用记录保持者的不愿意性；他们是在传统招聘和“Ban-the-Box”的情况下这样做的，而且无论申请人是否有轻罪或重罪定罪，他们都会这样做。明确的政策含义是雇主应该获得这两种激励措施。 工作机会税收抵免和联邦债券计划这两个联邦计划目前提供类似的激励措施，但这两个计划都没有得到广泛使用。我们的研究结果表明，应采取措施增加并扩大其使用范围。由于康复证书也有助于雇用记录持有者，因此也应采取措施增加其使用。