We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short-lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.

中文翻译：

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 救助耻辱


我们开发了一种救助耻辱模型，其中接受救助表明公司资产负债表疲软并降低其融资前景。为了避免耻辱，优质企业在接受救助后退出后续融资或完全拒绝救助，以发出有利信号。前者会导致短暂的刺激，随后出现市场冻结，情况比没有救助的情况还要严重。后者尽管有延迟，但仍使融资市场复苏到可以实现的水平，而没有任何耻辱，并实现了有限的最佳结果。多项救助计划加剧了救助的耻辱，并加剧了市场冻结。