We analyze a principal-agent model in which an effort-averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.

中文翻译：

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说谎说真话：选择性操纵和改进的信息传输


我们分析了一个委托代理模型，在该模型中，厌恶努力的代理可以操纵公开可观察的绩效报告。委托人无法观察代理人的努力成本、她的努力选择以及她是否操纵了报告。最优合同将补偿与已实现的产出和（可能被操纵的）报告联系起来。操纵对委托人来说是有利的，因为它可以使报告提供更多有关代理人努力选择的信息，从而减少代理人的信息租金。这是通过一份合同来实现的，该合同激励代理人根据她的努力选择有选择地参与操纵。