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Customer and provider bounded rationality in on-demand service platforms
European Journal of Operational Research ( IF 6.0 ) Pub Date : 2024-08-17 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2024.08.013 Danna Chen , Yong-Wu Zhou , Xiaogang Lin , Kangning Jin
European Journal of Operational Research ( IF 6.0 ) Pub Date : 2024-08-17 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2024.08.013 Danna Chen , Yong-Wu Zhou , Xiaogang Lin , Kangning Jin
The growing literature on operations management in the context of the sharing economy typically assumes that both customers and providers are fully rational. In contrast, we consider an on-demand service platform (e.g., Didi and Uber) with boundedly rational customers and providers that sets a price charged to customers and a wage paid to providers. Both customers and providers are sensitive to the payment terms set by the platform and also to congestion in the system (given by the relative numbers of available customers and providers in the market). We capture bounded rationality using a model in which customers and providers are incapable of accurately estimating the congestion level. We examine the impact of bounded rationality on the platform profit, consumer surplus, and labor welfare. We find that both customers’ and providers’ bounded rationalities may benefit the platform. Specifically, when customers’ or providers’ bounded rationality level and service valuation are relatively large or the valuation is relatively small, more irrational customers or providers increases the platform’s profit. Moreover, we find that the platform can exploit the bounded rationality differences between customers and providers to gain profit. Counterintuitively, we also demonstrate that the high bounded rationality of customers or providers may increase consumer surplus and/or labor welfare. Finally, bounded rationality on one side (e.g., customer side) can make bounded rationality on the other side (e.g., provider side) more likely to increase the platform’s profit, consumer surplus, or labor welfare under certain conditions.
中文翻译:
按需服务平台中客户和提供商的有限理性
越来越多的关于共享经济背景下运营管理的文献通常假设客户和提供商都是完全理性的。相比之下,我们考虑一个具有有限理性客户和提供商的按需服务平台(例如,滴滴和优步),该平台设定向客户收取的价格和向提供商支付的工资。客户和提供商都对平台设定的支付条款以及系统拥堵(由市场上可用客户和提供商的相对数量给出)敏感。我们使用一个模型来捕捉有限理性,在该模型中,客户和提供商无法准确估计拥堵水平。我们研究了有限理性对平台利润、消费者剩余和劳动力福利的影响。我们发现客户和提供商的有限理性都可能使平台受益。具体来说,当客户或提供商的有限理性水平和服务估值较大或估值较小时,更多的非理性客户或提供商会增加平台的利润。此外,我们发现该平台可以利用客户和提供商之间的有限理性差异来获取利润。与直觉相反,我们还证明,客户或提供者的高度有限理性可能会增加消费者剩余和/或劳动力福利。最后,一方面(例如客户方)的有限理性可以使另一方(例如提供商方)的有限理性在一定条件下更有可能增加平台的利润、消费者剩余或劳动力福利。
更新日期:2024-08-17
中文翻译:
按需服务平台中客户和提供商的有限理性
越来越多的关于共享经济背景下运营管理的文献通常假设客户和提供商都是完全理性的。相比之下,我们考虑一个具有有限理性客户和提供商的按需服务平台(例如,滴滴和优步),该平台设定向客户收取的价格和向提供商支付的工资。客户和提供商都对平台设定的支付条款以及系统拥堵(由市场上可用客户和提供商的相对数量给出)敏感。我们使用一个模型来捕捉有限理性,在该模型中,客户和提供商无法准确估计拥堵水平。我们研究了有限理性对平台利润、消费者剩余和劳动力福利的影响。我们发现客户和提供商的有限理性都可能使平台受益。具体来说,当客户或提供商的有限理性水平和服务估值较大或估值较小时,更多的非理性客户或提供商会增加平台的利润。此外,我们发现该平台可以利用客户和提供商之间的有限理性差异来获取利润。与直觉相反,我们还证明,客户或提供者的高度有限理性可能会增加消费者剩余和/或劳动力福利。最后,一方面(例如客户方)的有限理性可以使另一方(例如提供商方)的有限理性在一定条件下更有可能增加平台的利润、消费者剩余或劳动力福利。