Since the 1990s, the EU has attempted to create a common electricity market. However, EU legislators are unsatisfied by the results. We argue that differentiated implementation of directives over time creates path dependencies that entrench national differences. The actor constellation of parties and incumbent operators at the beginning of the liberalization path determines how well countries implement liberalizing directives. The implementation, in turn, changes the actor constellation for the next directive, increasing or decreasing the institutional power of incumbents. We illustrate our argument analyzing the implementation of the first three energy market packages in Germany and the Netherlands. Both countries had similar electricity markets at the beginning of market liberalization, but their actor constellation was slightly different. German implementation gradually strengthened vertically integrated utilities, while Dutch implementation dismantled these utilities through unbundling. These paths became self‐reinforcing, counteracting European harmonization efforts.

中文翻译：

---

自我执行的路径依赖轨迹？德国和荷兰实施欧盟能源计划的比较


自20世纪90年代以来，欧盟一直试图建立一个共同的电力市场。然而，欧盟立法者对结果并不满意。我们认为，随着时间的推移，指令的差异化实施会产生路径依赖，从而加深国家差异。自由化道路初期的政党和现任运营商的行动者群决定了各国执行自由化指令的效果。反过来，执行过程会改变下一个指令的行动者群，增加或减少现任者的机构权力。我们通过分析德国和荷兰前三个能源市场计划的实施情况来阐述我们的论点。两国在市场自由化之初都有相似的电力市场，但参与者阵容略有不同。德国的实施逐渐加强了垂直整合的公用事业，而荷兰的实施则通过分拆拆除了这些公用事业。这些路径变得自我强化，抵消了欧洲的协调努力。