Recent experimental findings suggest that a life full of interesting, challenging, and emotionally heightened experiences—what psychologists now refer to as psychologically rich experiences—is valued, not for the happiness it produces (if any) or the sense of meaning it might bestow on our lives, but for its own sake. A psychologically rich life is, as Besser, L., & Oishi, S. (2020). The psychologically rich life. Philosophical Psychology, 33, 1053–1071.) argue, “valuable and choice-worthy on its own,” independent of its relations to other conceptions of prudential value. The hypothesis then represents an implicit challenge to traditional conceptions of well-being, like hedonism, desire satisfaction theory, and even some forms of objective list theory, since such theories deny that psychological richness is “fundamentally” valuable. Since the authors ground their hypothesis on the empirical data, it should be the case that the data indicate that respondents deny that the value they assign to psychological richness rests on its relation to all plausible conceptions of well-being. The data, I argue, do not show this. Moreover, the term ‘experience’—as it figures in the experimental design—is ambiguous. Consequently, we cannot (yet) determine if the objects of respondents’ judgments refer to their psychological reactions to events or the events themselves.

最近的实验结果表明，充满有趣、具有挑战性和情绪高涨的经历（心理学家现在称之为心理丰富的经历）的生活是有价值的，而不是因为它产生的幸福感（如果有的话）或它可能赋予的意义感我们的生活，但也是为了生活本身。正如 Besser, L. 和 Oishi, S. (2020) 所言，心理丰富的生活是这样的。心理上丰富的生活。 《哲学心理学》 ， 33，1053-1071 。）认为，“其本身就有价值且值得选择”，独立于其与其他审慎价值概念的关系。该假设代表了对传统幸福观念的隐含挑战，例如享乐主义、欲望满足理论，甚至某些形式的客观列表理论，因为这些理论否认心理丰富性具有“根本上”的价值。由于作者的假设是基于经验数据，因此数据表明受访者否认他们对心理丰富性的评价取决于其与所有合理的幸福概念的关系。我认为，数据并没有表明这一点。此外，“体验”一词——正如它在实验设计中所体现的那样——是含糊不清的。因此，我们（还）无法确定受访者判断的对象是指他们对事件的心理反应还是事件本身。