In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory of epistemic justification. A number of issues will crop up along the way – including the relation between justification and rationality, the nature of defeat, the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, the importance of positive epistemic duties, and the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes.

中文翻译：

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持有不一致的信念是否是理性的？

在本文中，我研究了是否存在一个人持有不一致的信念是理性的情况，如果存在的话，这可能对认识论辩护理论产生什么影响。在此过程中会出现许多问题，包括正当性与理性之间的关系、失败的本质、认识困境的可能性、积极认识义务的重要性以及过渡态度和最终态度之间的区别。