Political decisions over economic growth policies influence the degree of bureaucratic autonomy and regulatory governance dynamics. Yet, our understanding of these processes in the Global South is somewhat limited. The article studies the post‐Global Financial Crisis period and relies on elite interviews and secondary sources from Turkey. It problematizes how an economic growth model dependent on foreign capital inflows, which are contingent on global financial cycles, influences the trajectory of bureaucratic autonomy. Specifically, we argue that dependence on foreign capital flows for economic growth creates an unstable macroeconomic policy environment: while the expansionary episode of the global financial cycle masks conflicts between the incumbent and bureaucracy, the contractionary episode threatens the political survival of the incumbent. In the case of Turkey, this has incentivized the ruling coalition to resort to executive aggrandizement to control monetary policy and banking regulation, which resulted in a dramatic decay of the autonomy of the regulatory agencies since 2013.

中文翻译：

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驾驭金融周期：新兴市场的经济增长、官僚自治和监管治理


关于经济增长政策的政治决策影响官僚自治的程度和监管治理动态。然而，我们对南半球这些过程的了解有些有限。本文研究了全球金融危机后时期，并依赖于土耳其的精英访谈和二手资料。它提出了依赖于外国资本流入的经济增长模式如何影响官僚自治轨迹的问题，而外国资本流入取决于全球金融周期。具体而言，我们认为，经济增长对外国资本流动的依赖造成了不稳定的宏观经济政策环境：全球金融周期的扩张性事件掩盖了现任者与官僚机构之间​​的冲突，而紧缩性事件则威胁着现任者的政治生存。就土耳其而言，这激励执政联盟诉诸行政强化来控制货币政策和银行监管，导致2013年以来监管机构的自主权急剧下降。