States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.

中文翻译：

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危机谈判拖延的政治


各国经常故意拖延危机谈判，希望发展军备或吸引盟友以获得更有利的谈判地位。为什么他们的对手在某些情况下容忍拖延，但在另一些情况下却攻击拖延？我认为这是因为各国无法完全区分故意延误和不可避免的延误。这呈现出一种战略紧张：如果故意拖延，一个国家更愿意进行预防性攻击，但否则更愿意避免代价高昂的战争。为了研究这种紧张局势，我建立了一个采用延迟策略的危机讨价还价的正式模型，表明崛起的国家可能会将讨价还价延迟掩盖在自然的外生延迟背后，以完成和平的权力转移。我发现，延迟来源的不确定性可能会在某些情况下降低战争风险，而在另一些情况下则增加战争风险。我讨论了我的理论模型对历史案例中战争和权力转移原因的影响。