We show that shared and improved auditing standards, as induced by the audit oversight arising from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)’s inspections on non-U.S. auditors, help global exporting firms upgrade themselves and tap into global value chains (GVCs). Using a dataset of U.S. waterway imports from global suppliers of 36 countries, we find that PCAOB international inspections not only lead to significantly more exports to U.S. buyers, particularly for intermediate and capital goods, but exporters also upgrade their product complexity. These results are consistent with enhanced information quality of exporters and thus reduced informational frictions with downstream importers. Echoing this notion, we find stronger GVC effects of PCAOB inspections for exporters facing more informational problems, i.e., for those with ex-ante lower reporting quality or smaller market shares, and those located in countries with weaker institutions or higher geopolitical risk with the U.S. PCAOB inspections also increase the duration length of the chain relationship and supplier firms’ relationship-specific investments in the chain. We further find that U.S. importers with a greater share of suppliers audited by PCAOB-inspected auditors exhibit boosted financial outcomes. Overall, our findings suggest that audit oversight facilitates the formation, upgrading, and performance along GVCs.

我们表明，上市公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB）对非美国审计师进行检查所产生的审计监督所引发的共享和改进的审计标准有助于全球出口公司升级自身并进入全球价值链（GVC） 。利用美国从 36 个国家的全球供应商进口的水路数据，我们发现 PCAOB 国际检查不仅导致对美国买家的出口显着增加，特别是中间产品和资本货物，而且出口商还提高了产品的复杂性。这些结果与出口商信息质量的提高一致，从而减少了与下游进口商的信息摩擦。与这一观点相呼应的是，我们发现，对于面临更多信息问题的出口商，即事前报告质量较低或市场份额较小的出口商，以及位于机构较弱或与美国地缘政治风险较高的国家的出口商，PCAOB 检查的全球价值链效应更强。 PCAOB 检查还增加了供应链关系的持续时间和供应商公司在供应链中针对特定关系的投资。我们进一步发现，接受 PCAOB 检查的审计师审计的供应商比例较高的美国进口商的财务业绩有所提高。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，审计监督有助于全球价值链的形成、升级和绩效。