How might international institutions matter? To consider this central question of International Relations, we analyze a most-likely case for the importance of materially driven enforcement: the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) use of blacklisting in the global regime targeting money laundering and terrorism financing. Scholars and practitioners often argue that fear of financial harm caused by FATF’s lists explains the near-global commitment to FATF’s standards, even if compliance lags. We search for statistical evidence of this impact across four different measures of financial flows and find that listing is not correlated with financial harm. To explain these null results, we examine bank decision-making and find that the lists’ impact is likely diminished by two overlooked factors: the existence of multiple, competing lists and banks’ access to more fine-grained, client-specific information provided by third-party companies. We interpret this contradiction—a commitment to compliance generated in part by a fear of enforcement, despite a lack of evidence for enforcement’s impact—as a “rational myth.” The results challenge a common understanding of a major global governance regime, confirm ideas about the limited ability of states or International Organizations to control governance outcomes, and advance a new research agenda on the impact of bank decision-making on global governance.

中文翻译：

---

全球金融治理执法的局限性：将 FATF 列入黑名单作为理性神话


国际机构有何作用？为了考虑国际关系的这个核心问题，我们分析了一个最有可能体现物质驱动执法重要性的案例：金融行动特别工作组（FATF）在针对洗钱和恐怖主义融资的全球制度中使用黑名单。学者和从业者经常辩称，对 FATF 清单造成的财务损失的恐惧解释了几乎全球范围内对 FATF 标准的承诺，即使合规性滞后。我们通过四种不同的资金流动衡量标准寻找这种影响的统计证据，发现上市与财务损害无关。为了解释这些无效结果，我们检查了银行的决策，发现名单的影响可能会因两个被忽视的因素而减弱：存在多个相互竞争的名单，以及银行可以获得由银行提供的更细粒度的、针对客户的信息。第三方公司。我们将这一矛盾（尽管缺乏证据证明执行的影响，但部分由于担心执行而产生的对合规的承诺）解释为“理性神话”。研究结果挑战了对主要全球治理制度的共识，证实了有关国家或国际组织控制治理结果能力有限的观点，并提出了关于银行决策对全球治理影响的新研究议程。