Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.

中文翻译：

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叛乱分子的能力和控制征兵：内战中的国家暴力和强制招募


尽管之前的研究已经认识到武装团体并不总是自愿招募战斗人员，但叛乱分子强制招募的种类和决定因素仍然知之甚少。是什么促使武装团体采用某些强制招募方法？本文概念化并研究了一种特殊的强制招募形式——叛乱征兵——叛乱团体依靠其行政能力强迫平民参战。基于强调国家暴力对叛乱分子招募影响的学术研究，我认为国家暴力会激励武装团体招募叛乱分子。利用 1946 年至 2008 年间国家与叛军二元组中叛乱分子征兵的新颖跨国数据集，我发现国家针对武装团体的平民支持基础增加了叛乱分子征兵的可能性。这些发现对于我们理解国家暴力与叛乱分子招募、叛乱分子与平民之间的关系以及内战中机构和网络的转变之间的关系具有重要意义。