Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.

中文翻译：

---

对保险的需求和授权的理由：来自工伤赔偿保险的证据。


工伤赔偿保险为工伤提供无过失保险，几乎在所有州都是强制性的。我们使用来自没有承保范围授权的独特市场的管理数据来估计工伤赔偿保险的需求，并利用监管保费更新进行识别。我们发现保费增加 1% 会导致承保范围下降约 0.3%。根据这些估计和成本数据，我们研究了政府干预以增加覆盖范围的潜在理由。这一分析表明，多种形式的市场失灵——例如逆向选择、市场力量和外部性——可能无法证明在这种情况下强制执行是合理的。