Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.

中文翻译：

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对保险的需求和授权的理由：来自工伤赔偿保险的证据。


工伤赔偿保险为工伤提供无过错保障，几乎在所有州都是强制性的。我们使用来自没有保险要求的独特市场的管理数据来估计对工伤赔偿保险的需求，并利用监管保费更新进行识别。我们发现，保费每增加 1%，保险费就会下降约 0.3%。利用这些估计和成本数据，我们研究了政府干预以增加覆盖率的潜在理由。该分析表明，几种形式的市场失灵——例如逆向选择、市场力量和外部性——可能无法证明在这种情况下授权是合理的。