We study the international coordination of bank capital requirements under a host-country rule: the requirement depends on where the borrower, not the bank, is located. In such a regime, countries compete for scarce bank equity capital. Raising a country’s requirement may generate bank capital outflows as well as inflows. We pin down the condition for the sign of the capital flow and the associated externality, and highlight the policy implications. Absent collaboration, overshooting is likely: individual countries have an incentive to increase Basel III’s Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer too much in good times and cut it too much in bad times.

中文翻译：

---

银行资本监管的跨境影响


我们研究东道国规则下银行资本要求的国际协调：要求取决于借款人而不是银行所在的位置。在这样的制度下，各国争夺稀缺的银行股本。提高一个国家的要求可能会导致银行资本流出和流入。我们确定了资本流动迹象的条件和相关的外部性，并强调了政策含义。如果缺乏合作，就可能出现过度调整：个别国家有动机在景气时期过多增加巴塞尔协议III的反周期资本缓冲，在景气时期过多削减它。