We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5–2.2% from trading in other firms' securities. Findings from cross-sectional analyses reveal that the reduction in loan spread is larger when the value of private information from bellwether firms is higher. Additionally, institutional lenders' excess returns are lower when lending to more transparent bellwether borrowers and when they pay a lower price—as reflected in loan spreads—in exchange for the private information, supporting the notion that the value of private information relates to institutional investors’ trading performance.

中文翻译：

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机构投资者向领头羊公司贷款的价值


我们预测，贷款集团中的机构投资者会向领头羊公司收取较低的贷款利差，作为获得私人信息的补偿，这些信息有助于识别其他公司公开市场证券的交易机会。与这一预测一致，在向领头羊公司放贷时，机构投资者收取的贷款溢价比非领头羊公司低 17 至 25 个基点，并通过交易其他公司的证券获得 1.5-2.2% 的年化超额回报。横断面分析的结果表明，当领头羊公司的私人信息价值越高，贷款利差的下降幅度就越大。此外，当机构贷方向更透明的领头借款人提供贷款并支付较低价格（如贷款利差所反映）以换取私人信息时，其超额回报较低，这支持了私人信息的价值与机构投资者相关的观点。 ' 交易表现。