We survey corporate managers of both guiding and non-guiding firms. We find that managers of firms that provide guidance say that they: (1) primarily provide guidance to satisfy analyst and investor demands and manage analysts’ earnings expectations; (2) are relatively unconcerned about proprietary or litigation costs (managers of firms are more likely to see litigation risk as a concern); (3) predominantly issue guidance that is conservative relative to their internal expectations; (4) are concerned that guidance induces analysts and investors to focus on the short-term but that it induces managers themselves to make myopic decisions internally. We also find that managers are miscalibrated about the accuracy of their guidance and that significant quantities of guidance that managers say their firms issue are not captured by conventional sources. We offer several other new insights relevant to the voluntary disclosure literature.

中文翻译：

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公司管理者对前瞻性指导的看法：调查证据


我们对指导性公司和非指导性公司的企业管理者进行了调查。我们发现，提供指导的公司经理表示，他们：（1）主要提供指导是为了满足分析师和投资者的需求并管理分析师的盈利预期； (2) 相对不关心所有权或诉讼成本（公司管理者更有可能将诉讼风险视为一个问题）； (3) 主要发布相对于内部预期保守的指引； (4) 担心指导意见会导致分析师和投资者关注短期，但会导致管理者自己在内部做出短视的决策。我们还发现，管理者对其指导的准确性存在错误校准，并且管理者所说的公司发布的大量指导并未被传统来源捕获。我们提供了与自愿披露文献相关的其他一些新见解。