Corruption of third-party judges seriously undermines the level of cooperation. Without intervention, more corruptors and defectors would emerge, disrupting social harmony. Therefore, introducing an anti-corruption mechanism is crucial for the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we propose a social monitoring mechanism to monitor third-party judges so that their payoffs are affected by the proportions of cooperators. Monte Carlo simulations on periodic boundary lattices. The results show that the social monitoring mechanism is effective in promoting cooperation and inhibiting corruption, and enhances the effectiveness of zealots in promoting cooperation. This facilitation effect is not only manifested in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game but also in the Snowdrift Game, which confirms the robustness of the results. Our research provides new insights for solving social dilemmas and curbing corruption.

中文翻译：

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第三方法官社会监督机制促进进化博弈合作


第三方法官的腐败严重损害了合作水平。如果不干预，就会出现更多的腐败分子、叛逃者，破坏社会和谐。因此，引入反腐败机制对于合作的演变至关重要。在本文中，我们提出了一种社会监督机制来监督第三方法官，使其收益受到合作者比例的影响。周期性边界晶格的蒙特卡罗模拟。结果表明，社会监督机制在促进合作、抑制腐败方面有效，增强了狂热者促进合作的有效性。这种促进效应不仅体现在囚徒困境博弈中，也体现在雪堆博弈中，证实了结果的稳健性。我们的研究为解决社会困境和遏制腐败提供了新的见解。