The social epistemology of science has adopted agent-based computer simulations as one of its core methods for investigating the dynamics of scientific inquiry. The epistemic status of these highly idealized models is currently under active debate in which they are often associated either with predictive or the argumentative functions. These two functions roughly correspond to interpreting simulations as virtual experiments or formalized thought experiments, respectively. This paper advances the argumentative account of modeling by proposing that models serve as a means to (re)conceptualize the macro-level dynamics of complex social epistemic interactions. I apply results from the epistemology of scientific modeling and the psychology of mental simulation to the ongoing debate in the social epistemology of science. Instead of considering simulation models as predictive devices, I view them as artifacts that exemplify abstract hypothetical properties of complex social epistemic processes in order to advance scientific understanding, hypothesis formation, and communication. Models need not be accurate representations to serve these purposes. They should be regarded as pragmatic cognitive tools that engender rather than replace intuitions in philosophical reasoning and argumentation. Furthermore, I aim to explain why the community tends to converge around few model templates: Since models have the potential to transform our intuitive comprehension of the subject of inquiry, successful models may literally capture the imagination of the modeling community.

科学的社会认识论采用基于主体的计算机模拟作为研究科学探究动态的核心方法之一。这些高度理想化模型的认知状态目前正处于激烈的争论中，其中它们通常与预测功能或论证功能相关。这两个功能大致对应于将模拟解释为虚拟实验或形式化思想实验。本文提出模型可以作为（重新）概念化复杂社会认知交互的宏观动态的一种手段，从而推进了建模的论证性解释。我将科学建模认识论和心理模拟心理学的结果应用于科学社会认识论中正在进行的争论。我没有将模拟模型视为预测工具，而是将它们视为体现复杂社会认知过程的抽象假设属性的工件，以促进科学理解、假设形成和交流。模型不必是准确的表示即可服务于这些目的。它们应该被视为实用的认知工具，在哲学推理和论证中产生而不是取代直觉。此外，我的目的是解释为什么社区倾向于集中在几个模型模板上：由于模型有潜力改变我们对探究主题的直观理解，成功的模型可能确实抓住了建模社区的想象力。