Sosa’s influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background commitments, which he in turn relates to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. A critique is offered of Sosa’s proposal, particularly with regard to how he aims to apply it to the problem of radical scepticism. In light of this critique, an alternative conception of hinge commitments is offered that enables them to play a very different role in our treatment of radical scepticism.

中文翻译：

---

索萨谈怀疑主义和背景

索萨在美德认识论方面颇具影响力的著作包括一项关于背景承诺的有趣提议，而他又将其与维特根斯坦的铰链承诺概念联系起来。对索萨的提议提出了批评，特别是关于他如何将其应用于激进怀疑主义问题。鉴于这种批评，提出了铰链承诺的另一种概念，使它们能够在我们对待激进怀疑主义的过程中发挥非常不同的作用。