When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of ‘sub‐intentional actions’, actions which are not intentional under any description at all. If true, they are direct counterexamples to the dominant view on which the difference between actions and other events is their intentionality. In this paper, I argue that the case for sub‐intentional actions fails. Firstly, I show that the main argument for the sub‐intentionality of these actions has a structural fault. Secondly, I argue that two apparently natural ways to remedy this fail. Thirdly, I argue that one of the main arguments for thinking of the phenomena as actions undermines thinking of them as sub‐intentional. Finally, I argue that a natural defensive move for the defender of sub‐intentional actions actually undermines the theoretical significance of the view. Ultimately, my aim is to show that although the case for sub‐intentional actions seemed both simple and compelling, it is in fact deeply troubled.

中文翻译：

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是否存在潜意识行为？


当我摆弄头发或调整姿势时，这些活动很可能远远低于我的认知雷达。一些人认为这些是“次有意行为”的例子，这些行为在任何描述下都不是有意的。如果属实，那么它们就是主流观点的直接反例，在主流观点中，行为和其他事件之间的区别在于其意图。在本文中，我认为潜意识行为的理由是失败的。首先，我表明这些行为的次意向性的主要论点存在结构性错误。其次，我认为两种明显自然的补救方法失败了。第三，我认为主要论点之一是为了将现象视为行动会破坏将其视为潜意识的想法。最后，我认为，对于无意识行为的捍卫者来说，自然的防御举动实际上破坏了该观点的理论意义。最终，我的目的是表明，尽管潜意识行为的案例看起来既简单又令人信服，但实际上却深感困扰。