We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straightforward rule that divides the budget proportionally is susceptible to manipulation. Recently, a class of truthful mechanisms has been proposed, namely the moving phantom mechanisms. One such mechanism satisfies the proportionality property, in the sense that in the extreme case where all agents prefer a single project to receive the whole amount, the budget is assigned proportionally.

中文翻译：

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真实汇总预算提案并保证比例


我们研究了一个参与式预算问题，其中一组战略代理人希望通过将他们的提案汇总到一个部门来将可分割的预算分配给不同的项目。不幸的是，按比例分配预算的简单规则很容易受到操纵。最近，人们提出了一类真实机构，即移动幻影机构。一种这样的机制满足比例属性，在极端情况下，所有代理都喜欢单个项目来接收全部金额，预算按比例分配。