We analyze two insider-trading regulations recently introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission: mandatory disclosure and “cooling-off period”. The former requires insiders disclose trading plans at adoption, while the latter mandates a delay period before trading. These policies affect investors’ trading profits, risk sharing, and hence their welfare. If the insider has sufficiently large hedging needs, in contrast to the conventional wisdom from “sunshine trading”, disclosure reduces the welfare of all investors. In our calibration, a longer cooling-off period benefits speculators, and its implications for the insider and hedgers depend on whether the disclosure policy is already in place.

中文翻译：

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披露与冷静：内幕交易规则分析


我们分析了美国证券交易委员会最近推出的两项内幕交易法规：强制披露和“冷静期”。前者要求内部人士在采用时披露交易计划，而后者则要求交易前有一段延迟时间。这些政策影响投资者的交易利润、风险分担，从而影响他们的福利。如果内部人有足够大的对冲需求，与“阳光交易”的传统观点相反，信息披露会降低所有投资者的福利。在我们的校准中，较长的冷静期有利于投机者，其对内部人和套期保值者的影响取决于披露政策是否已经到位。