Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981–2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.

中文翻译：

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从合作到暴力：管理竞争性威权选举


独裁选举常常因针对选民和候选人的系统性恐吓和暴力而受到损害。独裁政权何时诉诸暴力选举策略？我认为，选举暴力是竞争性威权选举中的一种风险管理策略，在这种选举中：(a) 政权拉拢地方精英、竞争对手和选民的前景很弱，(b) 选举暴力的预期政治成本很低。我通过解释穆巴拉克统治下的埃及最暴力的选举（1981-2011）：2005 年议会选举期间选举暴力的地方分布来检验这些命题。结果表明，在以下地区，选举暴力较高：政权拉拢当地精英的能力较低；面临来自没有拉拢潜力的意识形态（而非寻租）挑战者的竞争；依附策略成本较高且效果较差；以及公民的非选举动员能力较低。结论为在不太民主的环境下遏制选举操纵和暴力提供了经验教训。